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Introduction 
 
The fall of 1355 witnessed a renewal of the war between Count William V of Hainaut, Holland and 
Zeeland, and John, the Bishop of Utrecht. By the end of the following June peace was once again 
restored. The peace ended another round in the seemingly endless conflict between the counts and 
the bishops. It would not be the last. But what sets this episode apart is the type and scope of 
records which have been handed down. Not just the count’s war accounts, kept by the clerk and 
comital council member Dirk Tienen, but also a muster roll of the count’s forces. In addition, several 
contemporary accounts from Holland have survived. 
Especially the muster roll deserves attention. It is part of a bundle of records related to the 
war, and includes the peace treaty between the count and the bishop. But more importantly, it 
contains a list of retinues (the muster roll as such), draft letters detailing debts to various lords, and a 
list of letters of restor issued by the marshal. Although a man-at-arms was required to appear at a 
muster with proper mounts, losing one gave rise to claim for compensation from the lord he fought 
for, a practice called restor.
1
 
Unfortunately the lists also have their limitations, which may explain why they never 
received historians’ full attention. They appear to be drafts, and notes which were simply bound 
together. Although some of the letters include dates, the muster roll as such does not. In addition, 
the retinues are not listed in a consistent manner. 
Nevertheless, the muster roll and the accounts jointly, offer a glimpse of some of the military 
practices in mid-fourteenth century Holland. The composition of the forces, their origin, their terms 
of service, references to arms and armament, allow the modern reader to assess the count’s 
objectives. Although the enemy was a traditional antagonist, the documents highlight a network of 
friends and vassals who fought on the count’s behalf. Many of whom share more than a noble or 
military background. In addition, the backdrop of strife and internal conflict in Holland and Zeeland, 
which had been settled only a few years earlier, provides an insight into the count’s strategic 
objectives. 
Apart from its intrinsic value, this snapshot enables a comparison between the count’s 
practices and those of the duke of Brabant. Warfare in medieval Brabant during the second half of 
the fourteenth century has been the subject of a recent study by Sergio Boffa.
2
 His work paints a 
vivid picture of the practices in this key principality of the Low Countries on the eve of Burgundian 
domination. A fate Brabant shared with Hainaut, Holland and Zeeland. As did Flanders, but other 
than Flanders, Brabant did not have the civic culture for which Flanders is well known. Flanders’ rich 
historiographical tradition is of limited use as the differences, which impacted also its military 
practices, set it apart from the surrounding principalities.
3
 
Count William V’s practices have led Huub Jansen and Peter Hoppenbrouwers to conclude he 
preferred soldiers and English archers.
4
 The preference for English archers and soldiers suggests that 
his forces were organized in the English manner, a tantalizing question, explicitly raised by Antheun 
Janse.
5
 Determining what forces William V mustered and where they were from will go a long way 
towards answering it. 
As will be argued below, the count’s force which marched on Utrecht was entirely mounted. 
The men originated mostly from outside his domains. A key group is formed by nobles from houses 
with domains along the lower reaches of the rivers Rhine, Meuse, Lek and Waal (hereafter: the river 
lands). These rivers formed the borders between Holland, Brabant, Utrecht and Guelders. But also 
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men with domains higher up the Rhine or Meuse, with similar riverine interests, played a key role. 
Why did these men serve and under what conditions? Where they mercenaries, or not? The nature 
of the operations, linked to the composition of the count’s forces, will be used to clarify the type of 
operation and the aims it supposed to achieve. But before that may be done, the events, which led 
to William encamping before Utrecht in May and June 1356, must be described. 
  
4 
 
The road to Utrecht in 1356 
 
Utrecht - the perpetual enemy 
 
From the 11th century onward Holland’s population increased. Land was reclaimed from the peat 
grounds, which formed a large part of the great estuary of Rhine, Scheldt, and Meuse. This process 
impacted the balance of power and changed the land and waterways of the estuary. It was the root 
cause of the many conflicts between the counts and the bishop of Utrecht. The former, expanding 
their domain towards Utrecht at the expense of the old diocese, had large tracts of land enclosed by 
dikes and brought into cultivation. Not only the steadily increasing population, but also the effects of 
dykes and polders on the course of the many rivers and waterways became a continued source of 
friction. In addition, the urbanization of the Low Countries, starting in Flanders in the 11th century, 
brought an increase in trade. The many rivers became a major source of income for whoever 
controlled them. Utrecht became the focal point of the counts’ ambitions during the fourteenth 
century.
6
 
The bishop of Utrecht had since Carolingian times been the central dignitary of the Empire in 
the northern Low Countries. Nevertheless, the diocese kept losing ground to various counts of 
Holland. The bishops were unable to put a stop to the land hunger of the various counts, but the 
counts could not knock Utrecht out. The bishops remained in control of some of the key river tolls 
and Utrecht remained one of the major cities in the region. The counts tried, and frequently 
succeeded at getting bishops elected who offered little resistance to the encroachment, either 
because they were family members of the major noble houses, or they were simply unable to cope 
with the various civic and religious factions which divided the city. However, this was not always the 
case. 
One bishop who was able to, albeit temporarily, buck this trend, was John of Arkel. Until 
1342, he seemed no different than many of his predecessors. Elected bishop in 1340 and a son from 
one of the major houses which held lands between Brabant and Holland, he nevertheless turned out 
to be a bulwark for Utrecht's interests. Helped in no small way by the civil war in Holland, and the 
willingness of the civic leaders of Utrecht, he halted the alienation of the lands around the major 
rivers.
7
 
He achieved this notwithstanding the intervention and clear cut ambition from the 
neighboring principalities, Holland and Guelders. Both Count William IV and his father divided the 
diocese by treaty with the duke of Guelders. In 1331 and 1342 the two cut up Utrecht in spheres of 
influence. William III also supported the conquest of territory in the Nedersticht, the area around the 
city of Utrecht proper. His son ended open hostilities but actively sought to influence the local 
politics, including the election of Bishop John. He succeeded, as his preferred candidate was elected, 
but it is unlikely he foresaw the eventual consequence of his choice.
8
 
And even when the counts were not openly engaged against the bishop, local conflicts were 
plentiful and often linked to the count’s business. When in 1333 a conflict between a village in 
Utrecht and their lord, William of Duvenvoorde, escalated, and the city of Utrecht retaliated (by 
burning two villages), he called up troops from Holland, Guelders and Cleve to strike back. As 
Duvenvoorde was also the count’s vassal, who at this time contemplated war against Brabant, the 
count put a stop to the affair.
9
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Although Bishop John had already shown disconcerting signs of independence, it took until 
1344 before Count William IV felt obliged to act. William IV's overseas activities had reduced his grip 
on the developments in Utrecht and Friesland. When he returned, he immediately started to 
strengthen his position. He welcomed the lord of Abcoude as his vassal. Although Sweder of Abcoude 
was the bishop’s man, he had come in conflict with him. In addition, the holdings of another lord 
from Utrecht, the lord of the key castle of Ysselstein, were assessed to ascertain his reliability as an 
ally. Nevertheless the count left for Prussia at the end of the year, leaving further preparations in the 
hands of his men.
10
 
The immediate cause of William IV’s subsequent attack on Utrecht in 1345 was the exile of 
some of his allies, a patrician family from the city. Count William IV responded by mounting a full-
fledged expedition against Utrecht.
11
 Notwithstanding the lengthy preparations, the attack came as a 
surprise. From 8 June until 23 July 1345 William besieged the city. A truce was agreed upon, William’s 
exiled allies were again admitted and four-hundred burghers had to beg his forgiveness. However, 
this, and the minor territorial expansion at Utrecht's expense, hardly seemed worth the costs 
associated with the expedition.
12
 In any event, it freed William to focus on Friesland, the other part 
of his domain where he believed matters needed to be set straight. 
The count landed near Staveren in Friesland in September 1345. Part of his forces, which he 
commanded in person, was overwhelmed and the count was killed. The remainder decided to 
retreat. His death brought a swift and ignominious end to the affair.
13
 After William IV's untimely 
demise, Bishop John saw a renewed opportunity to reassert his power. Everyone who had assisted 
count William IV during the siege was to submit to his authority, including the lords of Abcoude and 
Montfoort. A number refused, and the bishop mounted several attacks, with little effect.
14
 
The death of William in 1345 made his four sisters potential claimants. The eldest, Margret, 
was married to the Holy Roman Emperor Louis IV, of the house Wittelsbach, the second daughter, 
Philippa, was married to the English king Edward III, the third to the duke of Jülich and the fourth was 
still unmarried. The eldest had strong claims due to the birth order, custom in Hainaut (but not in 
Holland and Zeeland), and the fact that her husband was Holy Roman Emperor. Nevertheless, 
Edward III did not concede. The stage was set for a conflict which could span England and the Holy 
Roman Empire. The fact that the not insignificant duke of Jülich was the weakest of the three, speaks 
volumes in this case.
15
 
 
An untimely death -the succession of William IV 
 
Early 1346 Margret received the counties of Hainaut, Holland and Zeeland from her husband the 
Emperor, as rightful heiress. In response King Edward III opened negotiations with the duke of Jülich 
and threatened with invasion.
16
 Margret's reception as countess in Zeeland proved troublesome. 
Some of the powerful nobles appeared to support Edward III. She tried to take charge, but to no 
avail. She fared better in Holland. The cities and towns accepted her, albeit with little enthusiasm.
17
 
Similarly, many nobles accepted Margret only passively, although very few appear to have actively 
resisted. However, she proceeded to favor those who supported her. Whether cause or effect, the 
privileges granted to these very few, members of the comital council and (extended) family, strongly 
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affected the relationships between the various noble families and were a seedbed for the 
subsequent civil strife.
18
 
The confusion and chaos after William IV’s death, also granted Bishop John an opportunity he 
did not wish to pass up. In early 1346 he again exiled the patricians who’s earlier exile had led to the 
intervention from Holland. In addition he went over to the offensive and attacked the region around 
Eemnes, a town taken by the Hollanders in 1339. A region they had since started, menacingly, calling 
East-Holland. The bishop also attacked Ysselstein, held for the count of Holland. An uprising by over 
four-hundred supporters of the exiled burghers in October ended badly for the exiles. It enabled the 
bishop to consolidate his position in the city. In addition, he tried to placate powerful nobles such as 
the lords of Vianen and Culemborg.
19
 
Meanwhile, Countess Margret could do little. In July 1346 she announced a one sided truce 
with Utrecht. She was unable to fill the power vacuum created by William IV's death. Given her 
vulnerable position; she wanted to suspend hostilities without offering peace. The opportunity 
offered by her weakness was apparent to others as well. Edward III sent a representative to the 
bishop to investigate the opportunities of an alliance but none was concluded.
20
 The bishop never 
accepted the truce and the parties remained at war. However, he did not undertake major military 
activities. Both sides continued to harass each other. The Hollanders strengthened their eastern 
frontier and continued with forming the administrative region East-Holland.
21
 
After William IV’s death, many in Hainaut, Holland and Zeeland had feared, and continued to 
fear that the three counties would be divided among his four sisters. To demonstrate his resolve to 
avoid such a division, the Emperor appointed his son, William, as stadtholder.
22
 In the course of 1347 
William strengthens his hold over his mother’s domains and stabilized the situation in Friesland mid 
1348 by accepting an (unfavorable) truce.
23
 By then, renewed war with Utrecht and the death of 
Emperor Louis IV in October 1347, affected the situation in Holland. 
The conflict between the electors of the Holy Roman Empire ensuing the Emperor’s death, 
led the house Wittelsbach to approach Edward III for help. However their opponent, King Karl IV, 
used the duke of Jülich to approach Edward as well. Edward still hoped for a divided inheritance and 
started marriage negotiations to wed his daughter to Karl IV. In addition, he transferred the staple 
for English wool to Middelburg, Zeeland.
24
 He probably intended to woo the locals, who depended 
on the trade with Flanders and England. The position of the dowager Empress Margret, and her son 
appeared more vulnerable than ever. 
During the summer of 1348 the bishop's forces raided Amstelland and Woerden and 
recaptured Eemnes. William responded early August by assembling an army and marching toward 
Utrecht. He challenged the bishop to do battle within three days between Ysselstein and the town of 
Jutfaas. When Bishop John failed to accept the challenge, William burned down the town.
25
 In 
November 1348 the count and the duke of Guelders agreed a treaty of mutual support and 
protection. In accordance with precedence, they agreed to divide Utrecht between them, apparently 
in response to the actions of the bishop against one of his vassals.
26
 
In early 1349 Margret proposed to abdicate in Holland and Zeeland, for which she wanted to 
receive a significant compensation, which William and the estates did not wish to pay. Her decision 
to abdicate was prompted by Wittelsbach hauspolitik. The family was embroiled in a power 
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struggle.
27
 However, in May 1349 Louis IV’s sons reached an agreement with Karl IV and settled their 
inheritance among themselves. This stabilized the situation. In addition Edward III moved the wool 
staple from Middelburg, although he kept an interested eye on Zeeland.
28
 
During the course of 1349 the war against Utrecht became grittier and harder. No holds were 
left barred; the count attacked the bishop's worldly and spiritual position. Nevertheless, in the end it 
was the bishop who came out on top.
29
 Meanwhile, Margret's abdication proposal led to a 
polarization among the nobles and cities of Holland and Zeeland. Although some cities, such as 
Dordrecht, welcomed William as count in 1349, he was not supported by a majority. His decision to 
claim the comital rights increased the polarization. The ambivalent attitude many people held, is 
underscored by the fact that it took violent action by his supporters to ensure his rise to power in 
1350.
30
 
 
Cods and Hooks – civil war 
 
In May 1350 a group of nobles from Holland set out to make William count in his own right, count 
William V. Their charter, also known as the Cod charter, formed the basis of the faction which later 
became known as the Cods (Kabeljauwen).
31
 After the death of a Cod in Delft in August, tensions rose 
and those nobles who opposed the Cods, drafted their own charter in support of Margret. This 
charter, dated 5 September 1350, formed the basis of the faction later known as Hooks (Hoeken).
32
 
Matters became heated when in February 1351 a group of nobles from Holland, led by Gerard of 
Herlaar, brought William V from Hainaut to Holland.
33
 
 The conflict which erupted centered around opposing views on two questions. Firstly, the 
issue was whether to follow the estranged Margret or choose her son, the usurper? Although William 
was a usurper, he had a valid claim and was present and actively governing. Secondly, was it 
acceptable that the inheritance of William IV would be used to further the Wittelsbachs hauspolitik 
or was it better to accept increased control by nobles and cities over government?
34
 
In the course of 1351 William V consolidated his position in Holland; he strengthened his 
defenses and eliminated Hook strongholds. He subsequently went over to the offensive. He not only 
defeated his mother’s forces, but also took Zeeland. By October he controlled both Holland and 
Zeeland.
35
 During the short campaign to take the various strongholds, William V used English 
mercenaries and Westphalian troops, led by Gerard of Herlaar.
36
 An English naval contingent arrived 
in Zeeland in support of Margret in early June, but it was defeated on the Meuse early the next 
month.
37
  
King Edward III intervened on Margret’s behalf because she had changed tack in 1351. She 
sought his help to effectuate her claims. This about-face by his mother was probably a key factor for 
William to support, or at least encourage, the Cods. However, Edward’s help did not come cheap and 
he and Margret never agreed on the price she had to pay. Edward most likely considered this to be 
an opportunity to further his own aims as he instructed his men to become involved in governing the 
counties to be reclaimed on Margret´s behalf.
38
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To hedge his bets, and most likely in the aftermath of the failed intervention, William V was 
brought into the English sphere of influence by arranging a marriage. Early 1352 he married Maud, 
the daughter of Henry of Grosmont, Duke of Lancaster. It was Edward’s intention to broker a peace 
treaty between mother and son, and to reduce the negative effect of his earlier military support of 
Margret.
39
 In 1353 the duke of Lancaster was sent to negotiate a treaty of friendship, after William V 
refused an earlier proposal for an offensive and defensive alliance with Edward.
40
 Although nothing 
comes of these activities, they are indicative of Edward´s interest in William V´s affairs. 
In light of the erosion of her position, Margret became more inclined to settle. During the 
second half of 1354 she and her son negotiated a settlement. William received the lordship over 
Holland, Zeeland and Friesland and became stadtholder in Hainaut. The financial compensation, 
payable to Margret, remained significant. The cities from Holland remained ambivalent, given the 
sums involved, and never explicitly supported the arrangement. Nevertheless, peace was concluded 
early January 1355.
41
 Almost five years of wars and conflicted had sapped much of the strength from 
Holland. The fact that Bishop John was unable to take more advantage of this sorry state of affairs, 
was not for lack of trying. 
During the years since the last war, the powerful lords of Utrecht, the lords of Culemborg, 
Vianen, Woudenberg, Sterkenburg, and Lichtenberg and the dean Uterlo, had tried to strengthen 
their position at the expense of the bishop. They held important appointments in the diocese and the 
bishop had pledged castles to them to secure loans, his loans. They, in turn, used these castles to 
mount raids and obstruct trade, much to the frustration of both the bishop and the city of Utrecht.
42
 
This conflict had also stimulated the bishop to seek peace with Holland. In May 1351 William 
V concluded a peace treaty with Utrecht as he wished to stabilize his eastern border. In addition he 
used this treaty as a propaganda victory in his effort to win Zeeland. However, in the balance of 
things, the peace was most favorable to Utrecht. The count lost the gains made during the preceding 
decades. However, the bishop did agree to withhold support for the Hooks.
43
 
Nevertheless, during the summer of 1352, Margret and the bishop also concluded a peace 
treaty. One which was almost identical to the one her son had concluded, except that the bishop 
now granted the Hooks freedom of movement and agreed not to arrest or hinder them. For obvious 
reasons William V saw this as a breach of his treaty with the bishop and considered himself no longer 
bound by it.
44
 
By then, the bishop had dealt with his troublesome lords. In 1352 the city and the bishop 
joined forces to force the magnates to relinquish the castles and their appointments. At least three 
of them did not comply. Bishop John, once again, called to arms. After considerable effort, and at 
great expense, he subdued the rebellious lords. The siege of Woudenberg took seventeen weeks, but 
when it fell, the viscount of Montfoort capitulated, although he was not the one being besieged. It 
took a further year to capture the stronghold at Ter Eem. However, in the end the bishop appeared 
to have prevailed. He reigned in the lords and reestablished control over his domains.
45
 However, the 
situation in Utrecht and various incidents between Holland and Utrecht after 1352, led to renewal of 
the conflict in 1355.
46
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William V returns to Utrecht 
 
William V prepared his offensive against the bishop well. The accounts of the war show that almost 
every conceivable source of revenue was used to collect the necessary funds. There are entries for 
payment from cities, bailiwicks, and monasteries. The receiver lists income from taxes, redemptions 
by commoners for military service (rhiemgeld), succession taxes, judicial fines, issuance of new rights, 
sale of comital domains. Other preparations included reaching out to the bishop’s half brother, lord 
John of Arkel, a powerful noble with extensive holdings along the lower Lek and Waal, to make sure 
he would “sit still” in a war with Utrecht.
47
 William V also had the trade with Utrecht watched in 
Flanders.
48
 
On Sunday 1 November 1355 William instructed his steward in South Holland to send smiths 
to castle Nesse, which was promptly done. Shortly afterwards, the steward also sent, per instruction, 
232 pounds of iron, a hat smith, coal, thirty eight pieces of steel to the same castle. In addition, a full 
smithy is sent. Although this was to be returned, the steward noted that it was destroyed and had to 
be replaced.
49
 
Notwithstanding the bishop’s effort to subdue his vassal, or consequently, many lords sided 
against him. The vassals who did are, unsurprisingly, the usual suspects. The most prominent ones 
were the lords of Ysselstein, Culemborg, Vianen, and Herlaar, but various others are listed as well.
50
 
In early November William V sails up river on the Lek and disembarks his forces near Wijk bij 
Duurstee. The lords who had declared for William V instructed their supporters in Utrecht not to 
fight with the bishop against the count.
51
 
Both sides raided and plundered. In November 1355 William V raided the bishop’s lands for 
eight days. During this raid William fought a skirmish at Kothen.
52
 The bishop was powerless to 
intervene, according to the chronicler, because his vassals who had sided with William V prevented 
him to march out. Simultaneously the lord of Egmond attacked the bishop's lands at Bunschoten.
53
 
The bishop did not leave the raids unanswered, and on 25 January 1356 (n.st.) he attacked Weesp 
and Muiden, which were burned, forcing the defenders to swim across the moat.
54
 Weesp was lost, 
but one of the bishop’s stone throwers was captured.
55
 On 14 March 1356 (n.st.) the count’s forces 
attacked the town of Soest. In response the bishop's troops from Amersfoort attacked the enemy 
column, the resulting skirmish costing both commanders their life.
56
 
The chronicler of Utrecht referred to foreign lords who helped William V. The lords ”Van der 
Dicke” and ”Van der Sleiden” are mentioned by name. Both were captured at Montfoort, together 
with forty of their men. They got lost while trying to reach the city of Oudewater. They were held, for 
the bishop, at the castle of Montfoort. However, the viscount of Montfoort, who was also the 
bishop’s marshal, declared himself neutral in April 1356 and let the prisoners go. A little later he 
became a vassal of the count.
57
 The affair was typical of the complex relationships entertained by 
many of the major nobles. 
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It was clearly not a premeditated plan. On 17 January 1356 (n.st.) the count instructed the 
steward to pay the lord of Ysselstein an amount of money to ransom the prisoners.
58
 Apparently, this 
did not have the intended result as on 8 March 1356 (n.st.), count William V ordered the storming of 
the castle of Montfoort.
59
 Whether the storming took place or not, is not clear. However, the 
accounts suggest that some repairs were in order, especially as the viscount now held the castle for 
William V. On 15 June 1356, while before Utrecht, the count ordered his steward to sent two large 
shipments of lime to Montfoort.
60
 The costs incurred by the viscount of Montfoort for the upkeep of 
his prisoners were not paid by William. Eventually a settlement was reached, but not with the count, 
although he received a copy. It set off toll exemptions against payment of the outstanding amounts, 
incurred by the viscount for the (named) Dicke and Sleiden. But it took until April 1359 (n. st.) to 
settle the account.
61
 
Count William V landed around 12 May 1356 near Utrecht, and attacked castle Nyenvelt. 
After a siege of seven weeks, using four stone throwers and other siege engines, the castle fell. It was 
subsequently burned down, according to the chronicler without the count´s approval.
62
 William 
encamped on the Hoge Woerd before Utrecht, on the other side of the river. Whether or not as a 
result of the destruction of Nyenvelt, the bishop and the count came to terms. On 30 June 1356 
William called a dagvaart on the Hoge Woerd, before Utrecht, on account of the conclusion of a 
peace treaty. The charter was witnessed by two council members of the council of Holland, Dirk of 
Brederode and John, Lord of Egmond, one of the councils from Zeeland (Floris of Borsele) and four 
cities, Dordrecht, Delft, Haarlem and Leiden.
63
 The nobles from Utrecht who sided with the count 
would have seized goods restored to them, some received reparations to castles. It included the, by 
now familiar, Ysselstein, Culemborg, viscount of Montfoort, and Vianen.
64
 On 19 June 1356, the duke 
of Guelders and the bishop also concluded a two year truce.
65
  
The war did not cause major changes between Holland, Guelders and Utrecht. However, the 
bishop paid a political price. The city council became a permanent partner in the affairs of state. 
Some things had changed.
66
 As a result of the war, the financial arrangements between Margret and 
William V had remained unexecuted. As the cities of Holland remained mute, and the war with 
Utrecht diverted the count’s means, there was simply no money. Although peace was restored on 30 
June, Margret had died a week earlier.
67
 William did not enjoy the fruits of his labors. When he 
returned from a trip to England in July 1357, he showed signs of mental illness. He was considered 
unfit to rule and was locked-up in Les Quesnoy, his castle in Hainaut.
68
 His younger brother Albrecht 
took over, first as warden and subsequently as count. 
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William’s Forces 
 
The muster roll 
 
The muster roll is part of an item described in the archive’s inventory as “charters by the Empress 
Margret and Duke William, concerning Holland, Zeeland and Utrecht.” The item is a bound volume 
consisting of sixty five paper folios. The volume contains thirty seven charters, numbered with pencil 
in modern Arabic numerals. The one but final charter is the treaty of 30 June 1356, the first charter in 
the third tom of the Charter book by Van Mieris.
69
 The last charter concerns payments to a steward 
for costs he incurred in the course of the war. Presumably it was Van Mieris who numbered the 
charters. 
Apart from the later numbering, these last two charters were given the contemporary 
heading “Utrecht”. They are followed by a one page (extract?) from the war’s account.
70
 The muster 
roll (folio thirty-four recto up to and including folio fifty verso) is the longest section of the bundle. It 
provides a list of retinues. Most retinues are identified at the top of the folio by the leader’s name. 
The section is followed by summaries of marshal’s letters, grouped by retinue as well. This fills the 
folios fifty-one recto through fifty-seven recto. The following section, titled “wages”, is merely two 
folios long, fifty-eight verso and fifty-nine recto. It contains letters setting out the consolidated debts 
of the count to various major lords, in exchange for providing troops. The final section, from folios 
sixty recto until sixty-two recto, lists various nobles from Holland who received a “letter”, without 
specification as to what message it contained. The lists do not match with any of the retinues in the 
roll. 
The folios are numbered with distinctly late medieval Arabic numerals. Folio thirty four is 
missing. There are no traces of it being cut or torn out, suggesting the numbering was added before 
the folios were bound. In addition, not all folios have been used; twelve have remained empty but 
form an integral part of the bundle. This suggests that the numbering was added before the folios 
were used or that the bundle was considered to be one notebook like document. Spilled ink in 
combination with an erroneous stroke suggests that (at least some of) the folios are in their original 
order, as the accidental line continuous on the next folio.
71
 
However, the handwriting appears to be from more than one author. The wording of the 
various texts which identify to the author or (more likely) instructor, refer to Dirk Tienen
72
 and Jan of 
Bueren.
73
 The layout of the folios is inconsistent; some folios contain one column, others two. The 
handwriting between the two columns is sometimes wildly different. And even if similar, the type of 
information provided about the retinues varies. The majority provides names and number of horses. 
Some are neatly itemized lists identifying men, horses and equipment. Other, however, are 
extremely short or lump groups of horsemen together in tens or more. Especially the retinues with 
men from more distant lands seem to have received less attention or the author had more trouble 
writing their names down.  
Apart from the writing, the wording and the abbreviations for horses and armor (or men-at-
arms) vary. The muster roll as such does not describe the horses, however the letters do, albeit 
succinctly. In all cases the animal’s color is listed but not much else. There is no reference to separate 
lists or description. The valuation of the deceased horse appears to be based on the former owner’s 
word or honor, as can be deduced from the letter’s wording. Interestingly, different ink was used to 
write names above the individual summaries of some of the marshal’s letters. Although they may 
                                                           
69
 Frans van Mieris, ed., Groot Charterboek der Graaven van Holland van Zeeland en Heeren van Vriesland, 
tome 3 (Leiden: Van der Eyk, 1755), p. 1. 
70
 NL-HaNA, Graven van Holland, 3.01.01, inv.nr. 219, fol. 33v. 
71
 ibidem, fols. 45v and 46r. 
72
 ibidem, fol. 33v. 
73
 ibidem, fols. 54r-59r. 
12 
 
have been intended as decoration, the fact that they are of poor quality writing and each appears to 
be different than the other, suggests that these were added by, or on behalf of, the addressees.
74
 
 
Horsemen 
 
The muster roll lists thirty six retinues, two of which are broken down in smaller troops. The retinues 
are identified by the name of their leader and specify in each case the number of horses. In some 
cases the number of men is listed, in most cases at least the most important members are named. All 
retinues appear to be mounted, although there are references to foot soldiers, these are in the 
accounts of the war and not the muster roll.  
The cavalry troop, or rotte, formed the basic unit and had a banner and a war cry. It was both 
an administrative unit and a fighting unit. It is equivalent to the French conroi, or montre. It was 
usually based on connections of vassalage or blood and almost always had a common geographical 
origin, led by a noble from the most prominent family. Their existence allowed princes to rapidly 
mobilize veteran units.
75
 In Holland, a number of important nobles and experienced leaders were 
called baenrots. Although the word is related to knight banneret, it originally referred to leaders of a 
troop, their seniority and power makes them more akin to barons. However at this time the title still 
had a strong military overtone.
76
 
 The names provided in the muster roll enable in many cases the identification of the leaders 
and, by references to towns or castles, the origin of the retinue. For example, the troop led by 
William of Elmpt, of thirty six horses, has twenty two named men-at-arms. The knight William of 
Elmpt came from the town with the same name, near Roermond on the Meuse.
77
 Seven other men 
have names which refer to a location within a fifteen kilometer radius, i.e. Wassenberg, Breimpt 
(currently Brempt), Herkenbuich (Herkenbosch), Rurenmunde (Roermond), Swalmen, Vlodorp 
(Vlodrop).
78
 
Lord Rost of Wijlre offers another interesting example.
79
 He commanded nine troops, in total 
close to three-hundred horses, making his one of the biggest retinues of the campaign. Relatively few 
members of his force are named, but the ones who are suggest they were mostly from Jülich. They 
had names such as Baugheym (currenlty Geilenkirchen), Garzwilre (Garzweiler), Hugelhoven 
(currently Bergheim), Kinswilre (Kinsweiler), Minsbach: (Munsbach), Schimper (castle Schimper, 
Limburg), Susterzeyl (Süsterseel), Vlattin (Vlatten), Vorsbach (currently Oberforstbach), and Wijswilre 
(Weisweiler)
80
 Similarly, the twenty two horse troop of the Lord of Roysin, a town in Hainaut, 
suggests a common geographic origin. Of the eight men who do not carry the lord’s name, four 
names refer to nearby locations. There is a companion named Blarignies and panchiers hailing from 
Haveluy, Marchines-a-pont (Marchienne-au-Pont), and Rogny.
81
 
In Brabant the strength of a rotte was counted in terms of glaive or panchier, in French, or 
pansier, in Middle-Dutch. In Brabant, the former consisted of one man-at-arms with two good 
horses; the latter was a man-at-arms with a single horse. Each combatant had to be equipped with 
two swords and a set of armor. This suggests that the glaive was the equivalent of the French lance. 
In a glaive of three or more horses, the man-at-arms was seconded by an armed horseman, a 
pansier, or mounted archer.
82
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The term pansier appears to be most frequently used to refer to the man in the muster roll as 
well, as the number of listed horses would be disproportionate to the number of men.
83
 In its French 
form it is explicitly the heading of a group of named combatants listed as part of a retinue from 
Hainaut.
84
 In Brabant in 1356 a glaive received one écu, a pansier received half that amount.
85
 This 
appears to have been the case in 1356 in Holland as well. Ghereijt of Drienen received payment for 
horsemen and foot men. For the horsemen, a total of thirty seven horses, he received one old écu a 
day for three horses.
86
 This supports the conclusion that the reference to a pansier in the muster roll 
is in many cases the man and not the cuirass as such. However, there are also references to pansier 
and harnasch as a reference to armor as such.
87
 A use also found in other sources, for example a 
specification of the military obligations of the town of Wieringen from 1397 which referred to both 
as equipment.
88
 
Although a more detailed breakdown of the muster roll is provided in annex 1, the overall 
conclusion is that the largest contingent came from Guelders, a little over 40%. It was followed by 
the men from Holland, who accounted for close to 20% of the force. The duchy of Jülich supplied 
nearly 10%. About 8% appears to come from Brabant, almost 10% if Limburg is included. Luxemburg 
provided 6%, practically all of the Sleiden force. Hainaut, Cleves, and Berg provided about 1-2% 
percent each. The origin of the remaining retinues cannot be determined with sufficient certainty. 
These numbers should be treated with care, as many nobles held fief from several overlords, as will 
discussed below. Nevertheless, it appears that Guelders, especially men with riverside domains, 
provided the brunt of the forces. 
Overall the muster roll lists 2,941 horses. The largest contingent is referred to as Hoorne, 302 
horses in total.
89
 Hoorne was one of the most important noble houses in the northern Low Countries, 
with large holdings in the river lands. Although no first name is given in the rolls, the accounts refer 
to jonkheer Loef of Hoorne.
90
 Around 1360, he had the castle Loevenstein built, which still dominates 
the strategic confluence of the rivers Meuse and Waal.  
A significant part of the retinue of the marshal, Dirk of Brederode, is identified as being from 
outside the lands, but their origin is not clear. According to the roll he commanded 276 horses.
91
 He 
was a Hook and one of the most powerful nobles of Holland. He was pardoned in 1354, rejoined the 
comital council in February 1356, was the marshal of the count’s forces during the war, and became 
baenrots some time later.
92
 
A similar force is commanded by the earlier mentioned Rost of Wijlre, as detailed above, his 
force came from Jülich, with one small troop from Luxemburg.
93
 His career spanned at least two 
decades as he, and the earlier mentioned Lord John of Sleiden, was witness to the call to arms by the 
duchess of Jülich in December 1371 against her sister, the countess of Cleves.
94
 
The 234 horse retinue led by the Lord of Cranendonc
95
 can be traced to Brabant. Cranendonc 
was a leading house from Brabant, several of its members sat on the ducal council.
96
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The lord of Zevenbergen, serving with 198 horses
97
, was most likely Gerard, a Cod and early 
supporter of William V with domains in the river lands on the border of Holland and Brabant.
98
  
There are two retinues referred to as led by Herlaar. The first led by the lord of Herlaar, the 
second by Arnt of Herlaar, with 68 and 175 horses respectively.
99
 The former is John, lord of Herlaar 
and Ameide, who had domains on the south bank of the river Lek near Vianen. The latter was lord of 
the castle Ammersoyen, another riverside castle between Brabant and Guelders. John and Arnt were 
the younger brothers of Gerard, the leader of the raid which had brought William V from Hainaut to 
Holland in 1350.
100
 In addition, Arnt was a witness to the lantfriede of Guelders and Cleves of 1359.
101
  
The lord of Rede had domains in the south of Holland (Grote Waard, Bommelerwaard, Land 
of Heusden) his 170 horse retinue originated from that region and possibly contained men from 
Zeeland and north western Brabant.
102
 As the Hook Herbaren, lord of Rede, had died in exile before 
June 1354, it is probably a relative but it is not clear who inherited his titles and lands.
103
 
The lord of Vorne was Walraven of Borne, later lord of Valkenburg (or Fauquemont).
104
 He 
became the enemy of the duke of Brabant during the war over those domains, which he received as 
imperial fief in 1356. This was probably after his exploits for William V, as he is not referred to as lord 
of Valkenburg. His domains occupied strategic locations. The lands of Borne were on the Meuse and 
Valkenburg dominated the trade route between Aachen and Brabant.
105
 He is already listed as one of 
the witnesses to the treaty between William V and the duke of Guelders of 3 November 1348.
106
 His 
force of 165 horses is a testament to his power, even before the expansion of his domains.
107
 
Van der Sleiden, was John, lord of Schleiden, from Luxemburg. His son joint the expedition of 
William’s successor to Friesland in 1396.
108
 Although captured, with forty horsemen according to the 
chronicles
109
, the roll indicates his retinue consisted of 165 horses.
110
 That this unfortunate incident 
was not the end of his involvement is indicated by the fact that he was paid before Utrecht in June 
1356, as was his fellow prisoner the Lord Van der Dicke. In addition, they both received 
compensation for their losses as prisoners, and reimbursement for costs incurred during their trip 
home.
 111  
The retinue of Wouter of Ysenderen consisted of 132 horses.
112
 He was the son of William of 
Ysenderen, a witness to the lantfriede of Guelders and Cleves of 1359.
113
 Wouter also was a vassal of 
the duke of Guelders.
114
 The total contribution of the listed nobles comes to 73.5% of the overall 
force. 
Assessing the combat effectiveness remains difficult on the basis of the muster roll. Some of 
these men were already in the count’s service in 1355, for example the captured Schleiden and 
Dicke. Others, such as the marshal were certainly present before Utrecht and most likely since the 
start of the war. Of others a specific term of service is mentioned. John of Kessel was paid for serving 
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one month, with ten men-at-arms, as identified in the accounts.
115
 The muster roll refers to fifteen 
named men and forty five horses
116
, the payment of one old écu per man, suggests that the ten men 
paid were equal to ten glaives or thirty horses. The discrepancy indicates men left earlier, or a 
separate payment was made for others. In any event, neither document appears to be complete. 
The earlier mentioned Lord of Rogny stayed a lot shorter, most of his men only nineteen 
days, and a few three days less.
117
 Unfortunately most entries in the accounts only provide the date 
of the letter by which wages were payable, not the duration of their service or the number of men. In 
any event, the muster roll does appear to represent the majority of the count’s forces. However, 
nobles such as Langherak, Merwede, and Steenre, a total of sixty-one horses, are mentioned in the 
accounts of the war, but not listed in the muster roll. The fact that the last two explicitly receive 
wages for garrison duty may explain the reason for their absence from the roll.
118
 However, 
Merwede was also present at the siege of Nyenvelt.
119
 
Surprisingly, none of the retinues appear to originate from Zeeland. Floris of Borsele is 
named as a witness to the peace treaty, but he is not identified in the rolls or the accounts of the war 
as one of the commanders. Apart from John Zuurmont, no nobles from Zeeland appear to be 
present, and Zuurmont is only mentioned as a council member. The majority of the twenty members 
of the comital council from Holland was present, while of the seven council members from Zeeland 
only the two earlier mentioned were. Zuurmont was hardly a local noble. He was a bastard son of 
William III who had received holdings in Zeeland.
120
 
 
Footmen 
 
The muster roll proper does not contain any references to footmen. A short summary of payments 
does, as do various entries in the accounts of the war. Almost all are bowmen. In addition, the 
marshal paid for a large number of bows and arrows in England, for which he was compensated after 
the war.
121
 The accounts mention a total of 139 bowmen. They are part of eleven sections, most of 
which are twelve men strong. Most are referred to as coming from a city, Delft (forty-seven men), 
Rotterdam, Leiden (twelve each) or The Hague (a mere four).
122
 A further twenty-eight are referred 
to as Englishmen, some of whom are also listed in the summary.
123
 
Intriguingly, one section of English bowmen was accompanied by a man called Thomas of 
Bullincbroek.
124
 This appears to be a phonetic reference to Bolinbroke, one of the main castles of the 
Lancastrian estate. As Henry of Grosmont, Duke of Lancaster, was William V’s father-in-law it is 
plausible that the Thomas in question was in some way related to him. Especially since this Thomas is 
the only Englishman identified by name. A Thomas of Lancaster is mentioned in a petition to the 
curia at Avignon, made in 1354. In it a Thomas of Lancaster, illegitimate son of Thomas, Earl of 
Lancaster (Grosmont’s brother), is identified as a chamberlain of the king and veteran of an attack on 
Sens.
125
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The bowmen appear to have been primarily employed in garrisons, at least during the phase 
before May 1356 (n. st.). Thomas of Bullincbroek received wages for his time at Naarden.
126
 Jacob of 
Rotterdam led a group of twelve bowmen who were paid for staying at the same place for ten weeks 
and at Weesp for two months. Similarly, the twelve bowmen led by John Heddinc were paid for four 
months and two weeks. Other bowmen were paid wages for service over periods of four months, 
nine weeks, and five months.
127
 Long stretches which do not match the various chevauchées the 
count undertook. It also appears that restocking the garrison at Nesse and Woerden is the reason 
why pikes and bows were sent there.
128
 
A clear exception to this are the sixteen bowmen employed during the siege of Nyenvelt.
129
 
Apart of this reference, the force besieging the castle and encamped before Utrecht must have 
contained a sizeable contingent of bowmen, as can be deduced from the amount of arrows acquired 
for William V. In March 1356 (n.st.) he ordered arrows, twenty four écu worth, approximately 
2700.
130
 Eight days before Pentecost (4 June 1356) the steward of south Holland sent a further 1800 
arrows to the count, by then encamped on the Hoge Woerd.
131
  
Although pikes are mentioned, only one section of twelve pike men is identified as such in 
the accounts.
132
 The count did not appear to have used forces provided by the cities from Holland or 
Zeeland; at least none are listed in the account or the muster roll.
133
 Interestingly thirteen citizens of 
Amsterdam are fined for not appearing on the Hoge Woerd.
134
 As a number of cities did witness the 
peace, it may have been the citizens’ absence during those proceedings which led to the fine.  
Footmen clearly played a role, but one which appears to have been limited to garrison duty. 
With the obvious exception of bowmen, who were present in the various garrisons and also during 
the siege of Nyenvelt, and presumably therefore formed part of the force which encamped before 
Utrecht between May and June 1356. 
 
Artillery and other specialists 
 
Middle fourteenth century, artillery served only to attack or defend city walls or fortresses. Boffa 
refers to the use of guns (donrebussen) in Leuven in 1356, both regular and big guns are reported, 
and from 1360 onwards these weapons are part of the regular city arsenals in Brabant.
135
 Similar 
references can be found in the accounts of the war. The count paid Nijs of Rotterdam for arrows and 
fifty donrebussen.
136
 The city of Dordrecht loaned the count siege engines (stone throwers), costs 
incurred for moving them and the stones were reimbursed by the steward of south Holland on 4 
June 1356.
137
 The earlier mentioned attack by the bishop on Weesp in January 1356 (n. st.) included 
stone throwers. The above mentioned sixteen archers at Nyenvelt protected a mole, a siege 
engine.
138
 
William V issued a letter on 9 March 1356 (n.st.), payable by the steward of south Holland, to 
John den Goeden, for donrebossen.
139
 A gunner named “Big Claes”, referred to as “the one who used 
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to shoot with the donrebussen“, is also mentioned in the sources.
140
 The Count's clerk reimbursed 
the marshal and John of Langheraek for a total sum of forty gold moutons for the fabrication of 
donrebussen.
141
 Interestingly, this is the only reference to the then relatively new French golden coin, 
minted since 1355. It suggests these donrebussen were made in France, Flanders or Brabant. 
The accounts of the war lists various letters received from craftsmen (sword smith, helmet 
maker, fletcher, and a mason) for payments to be made to them.
142
 This apart from the mentioned 
smiths, smithy, coal, iron and other equipment sent to Nesse in November 1355.
143
 That these men 
were kept busy maintaining the counts forces is illustrated by the purchase of 1,000 horseshoes, and 
20,000 nails on 18 May 1356 (n.st.) for delivery to the marshal.
144
 The only specialists who are 
mentioned in the muster roll are a piper and a drummer.
145
 
William V’s artillery appears to have been used for the operations after May 1356. The 
purchase of munitions and weapons suggests that it was the march on Utrecht for which the arrows 
were stockpiled. The references to the stone throwers and the mole are all in relation to the attack of 
fortified towns or castles. 
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War aims 
 
Medieval strategy 
 
Battles were infrequent as it usually required the willingness to give battle on both sides and, as they 
were high stake endeavors, that was an infrequent occurrence. In many cases, battle was a risk 
worth taking for a ruler with much to lose in the short run, either because he did not have the 
financial resources to engage in a prolonged conflict or he did not have the moral resources. For 
example a ruler with a weak(er) claim to his throne was challenged. However, battles, if won, could 
bring quick and decisive gains.
146
 As contemporary rules recognized this tendency, they tried to find 
conditions favorable to winning such an encounter. 
Ideally, a battle would be fought tactically defensively, i.e. a battle in which the enemy was 
forced to do the attacking on the battlefield itself. Even if the battle was sought by the forces on the 
strategic offensive, i.e. the invaders, they tried to remain on the defensive on the battlefield itself. 
Key benefits of the tactical defensive are that the defender will usually choose the battlefield and 
that the enemy will be forced to advance. Consequently, it will become disordered, reducing its 
combat effectiveness. Advancing will exhaust soldiers and disrupt a formation, both by creating 
openings and compression. The former may create opportunities to break into the advancing enemy 
formation and the latter may lead to losses without combat, as, in the worst case scenario, troops 
are crushed. But in any event, they will have insufficient room to effectively wield their weapons, 
which significantly reduces their combat effectiveness.
147
 
As the enemy could be expected to be aware of the risks, the invaders had to provoke the 
enemy to give battle. Apart from an enemy who wildly underestimated the enemy force, a 
commander had a number of strategies to achieve his aim, for example by insulting the enemy, 
demonstrating his impotence to protect his lands, or infringing his sense of honor. A more down to 
earth approach, with which it could be combined, was to provoke a response by besieging an 
important city or castle; or by causing sufficient damage to the enemy to make taking the risk of 
battle worthwhile.
148
 
A challenge by the invader should be delivered in a fitting manner; it should be clear enough, 
known to the enemy and the public at large. It might be insulting or might be courteous, in any event 
it should help to either override the defenders good sense or force his hand. But above all, it should 
make clear the invader was willing to accept battle, and not deliver it. That questionable honor befell 
the enemy.
149
 
For these reasons the principal forms of military operations in the fourteenth century were 
the chevauchée, the guerre de courses, and the raid. The raid required a small and mobile group, 
which could be collected unbeknown to the enemy, to surprise a town or castle or plunder an area. A 
guerre de courses can be characterized as a form of war consisting of many raids, intended to 
destabilize the enemy politically, plunder domains, reduce the countryside, and possibly win 
bargaining chips in the form of town or castles. The chevauchée sought to achieve the same war aims 
as the guerre de courses, but on a grander scale. By forming a large host, which ravaged the 
countryside, the invader achieved the aims set out above, and challenged the local prince to defend 
his lands.
150
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Chevauchées were executed with mounted forces; however they consisted of few nobles and 
even fewer knights. The duke of Brabant, for example, contracted a force of 868 men, all mounted, 
of which only sixty-three were knights, 402 where esquires and 403 were commoners. The 
indentures specify the troops and their status. However the size of each of the contingents is 
markedly different, the largest are provided by the Viscount of Limburg and the lord of Cuyk, 
hundred-and- two and hundred respectively.
151
 
 
William V’s war aims 
 
To enable an assessment of William V’s aims in his war, the context and contents of the muster roll 
needs to be clarified. For example, if the muster roll lists a collection of garrisons across his domains, 
the conclusions would be different from those drawn here. Although the general scope of events and 
their chronology is known
152
, understanding the size and type of force, helps to understand the 
count’s aims. 
 William V appears to have organized a chevauchée to Utrecht in May and June 1356. The 
collection of documents of which the muster roll as such forms part, was most likely made during or 
shortly after its conclusion. The folios are numbered with late medieval Arabic numerals, suggesting 
they were bundled at a date contemporary with the event. They contain notes from both the comital 
council member Dirk Tienen
153
, who also kept the accounts and the count’s squire, John of Bueren.
154
 
These men were both present before Utrecht with the count. The documents include the full text of 
the peace treaty. It contains the drafts of the marshal’s letters detailing debts and restor, written by 
Bueren. These letters would be written at the end of the campaign. Moreover the drafts which do 
contain dates are al of the period May up to and including July 1356. Men who are mentioned in the 
accounts but not in the rolls are in most cases mentioned as being paid for garrison duty. 
Nevertheless, there are at least two arguments which do not support this conclusion, the men who 
besieged Nyenvelt, near Utrecht, are not mentioned in the rolls and the documents could merely 
have been combined during the course of 1356 or some time later. 
 As the accounts demonstrate that there was a limited amount of foot men involved, and also 
the chronicle neither mentions large formations of foot, nor operations suggesting the existence 
thereof, the muster roll is probably highly representative of the force collected by the count. Which is 
underscored by the fact that, although a summons was send for aid to many nobles in Holland
155
, 
hundred men-at-arms provided by Hoorne were sent back, with the count’s consent. The note in the 
muster roll mentions that forty carthorses were not sent away.
156
 It is likely that the count’s vassal 
were asked for financial aid, comparable with the situation in Brabant at the time.
157
 
The counts of Holland from the House Wittelsbach tended to call general mobilization 
(heervaart), for technical operations, especially sieges.
158
 After 1358 general mobilizations by the 
counts become, again, a frequent occurrence. William V did not use these summons to call up forces 
for his wars.
159
 The absence of such a mobilization supports the conclusion that this was a 
chevauchée. 
This is furthermore supported by the fact that the troops which took part were experienced 
and battle hardened. The lords of Jülich and Guelders built towers and strongholds along the rivers, 
the arteries of trade and commerce between the Rhineland and Holland. They extracted tariffs and 
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tolls from the passing ships. The duke of Jülich and the duke of Guelders profited from their actions 
and supported them; these robber barons were respectable lords and council members.
160
 In 
Guelders during these years a feud between two powerful noble houses, Hekeren and Bronckhorst, 
divided the land. Because the young duke and his disenfranchised brother Edward chose sides, a 
state of internecine war existed.
161
 
In the middle of the fourteenth century troops from Jülich and Guelders fought both for and 
against the duke of Brabant as well. Many were knights and nobles, and were vassals of the duke of 
Jülich or Guelders respectively. They were members of the community of arms and were valued for 
their prowess and combat experience. Experience they had gained during near endless conflicts and 
while extorting, and robbing merchants which crossed their lands. They were robber barons, but 
should not be called mercenaries as such.
162
 
Compared with the situation in Brabant, William V collected an impressive force for his 
march on Utrecht. The army raised by the duke of Brabant during the war of succession in 1356-57 is 
estimated to have been between 3000 and 3500 men. The forces, which were collected for the large 
chevauchée against Jülich in 1371, may have totaled up to 5000 combatants. These were large 
armies, and unusual.
163
 They do give further strength to the argument that William V’s expedition 
against Utrecht should be qualified as a chevauchée. 
This was, as one can expect, a well known type of operation, which Bishop John also 
employed. For example, just before the war he rode out in a show of force to convince unwilling 
vassals to remain loyal. Later that same year, he responded to a raid by the Lord of Meervelt, in the 
bishopric of Münster with a force said to have been over 2000 troops on horseback. He burned down 
the raider’s castle, watermill and surrounding lands and made peace.
164
 
William V’s chevauchée in 1356 also has much in common with later chevauchées. Albrecht, 
William V's brother and successor supports the Count of Flanders against the rebellious town of 
Ghent in 1381. In July Albrecht sent an estimated 450 troops, led by the lord of Brederode. The force 
also includes high ranking nobles such as William of Gommegnies, from Hainaut. The forces remained 
at the Count of Flanders disposal for about eleven days. Albrecht also supported the duke of Brabant 
by sending a mounted force in his support in 1382. The summons went out to a specific list of nobles 
from Holland. The lords who were called, were explicitly requested not to bring more troops than 
requested, troops supplied over the quota were sent back. For those troops which did participate, a 
fixed compensation was negotiated, both as wages and as reimbursement for expenses.
165
 
The conclusion must be that count William V’s operation in May and June 1356 should be 
qualified as a chevauchée. There are no sources which indicate William attempted to besiege 
Utrecht, although the materials were present to execute a siege of castle Nyenvelt, the absence of a 
general mobilization and the force composition, i.e. mounted troops, suggest he did not contemplate 
a siege of the city itself.
166
 The chevauchée may have been intended to shore up his position in his 
own lands. His challenge to the bishop, encamping before Utrecht with impunity, will have 
demonstrated his strength. Although the chronicle claims William V did not want Nyenvelt 
destroyed, its destruction, in plain sight from Utrecht, would have conveyed the message which the 
count wanted to sent. Similarly, the letter he sent during his campaign of 1348, challenging the 
bishop to appear within three days at a field near the border, could have served a similar purpose. 
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Terms of Service 
 
In what manner did William V obtain the services of such a diverse group of men-at-arms? Given that 
the majority came from outside his lands and, it may be presumed, that many were chosen for their 
experience. Were they mercenaries? Following Garlan, Boffa distinguishes between those who serve 
first and foremost for gain and those who serve because they belong to a political community. He 
identifies foreign lords who served at the pleasure of the duke of Brabant, but were treated identical 
to the local lords with regard to obligations and conditions of service. In addition, whether or not a 
person was foreign was based not on birth or language but whether he was linked, socially or 
politically, to the group. Consequently, geographical origin is less relevant than the terms of service 
to distinguish the soldier from the mercenary. 
Fief rents and indentures, frequently used by the kings of England and the dukes of Burgundy 
for example, could create a bundle of obligations for a nobleman with various liege lords. This, and 
the shared culture, both when bearing arms and when not, made a vassal who received fief rents 
members of the same community. Although many received wages, and were therefore by definition 
soldiers, they should not be considered mercenaries. The true mercenaries, still according to Boffa, 
are those who serve for pay and are not part of this community. In Brabant mercenaries were mostly 
the archers and foot soldiers.
167
  
The fief rent, a sum of money regularly paid by the lord to his vassal in exchange for the 
feudal obligations, here mostly military support, was very popular in the thirteenth and fourteenth 
century, especially in the Low Countries.
168
 Fief rents should not be equated with an indenture, the 
fief rent would be paid whether the holder was called up or not. It was also often not enough to 
cover the costs of such military support; consequently the holder would receive wages if called up. 
Fief rents were not used to pay mercenaries. They were a way to create a bond between two men 
beyond a mere contract.
169
 
The fief rent appears to have been one of the main instruments with which William V created 
the community upon which he drew to summon his forces for the war against Utrecht in 1355-56. 
For example, the lords of Cuyk, and Valkenburg held fief rents from most lords of the Low Countries, 
the Rhineland and the kings of England and France.
170
 However, not just magnates were part of this 
community. 
John, lord of Kessel, led a forty five horse retinue of which Matthias of Kessel is a member. 
Both are also mentioned in the restor letters.
171
 Matthias received a toll on the river Meuse as a fief 
from the duke of Guelders in 1356.
172
 Matthijs also was a vassal of the lord of Hoorne and Altena, a 
brother of the earlier mentioned Loef of Hoorne. He witnessed his lord granting a fief rent in 1345, 
payable from another river toll.
173
 The lords of Hoorne themselves were magnates who’s domains 
included extensive holdings in territories disputed between the count of Holland and duke of 
Brabant, such as the lands of Heusden and Altena.
174
 
The earlier mentioned lord John of Schleiden received a fief rent from William V on 17 May 
1357.
175
 The accounts mention payment of the income from a fief rent to Rost of Binsvelt.
176
 He is 
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mentioned on the muster roll with a troop of thirty horses.
177
 Another example is Sweder of 
Abcoude, he was a vassal of the count of Hainaut, Holland and Zeeland and the duke of Brabant.
178
 
He and his brother William of Abcoude, lord after Sweder’s death, were called typical exponents of 
the military customs of the river land nobles. With domains bordering Utrecht, Guelders, Holland and 
Brabant, they were active in conflicts in all four lands during the course of the two decades before 
Albrecht’s expedition to Leuven in 1382. William of Abcoude’s behavior is commonly associated with 
that of condottieri.
179
 
A further indication of the nature of this relationship between lord and vassal, even if it was 
based on fief rents, is suggested by the list of men who did homage to count William III in 1333.
180
 Of 
this list of twenty-six vassals four share their name with retinue leaders on the muster roll: 
Broechusen, Reden, Mierlaer, Vorne (Valkenburg).
181
 The contribution of Conrad, the son of John of 
Schleiden, in 1396 has already been mentioned. Another name which reoccurs is Blankenheim, also 
listed as a member of the Schleiden retinue.
182
 
According to Boffa, payment of wages resolved some of the issues concerning the conflicting 
vassalages and enabled the recruitment of the desired troops. Troops were therefore not necessarily 
the (in)direct vassals of the prince they followed. Nonetheless, in Brabant the important lords led a 
significant part of the forces in the duke of Brabant’s army which fought at Baesweiler in 1371. They 
provided nearly a quarter of the men-at-arms, and were accompanied by a large train. They 
represented, however, a small fraction of the duke's vassals, and the duke did not raise his army by a 
levy from his direct vassals. And even these important lords, were probably not called up on grounds 
of their vassalage.
183
 
This appears to match the facts of William V’s war in 1355-56 as well. Most men received 
wages, such as the lords of Amstel and Cronenburch.
184
 The majority is listed as being paid by the 
count on the Hoge Woerd before Utrecht, including Hoorne, Heukelom, Hessen, Ysenderen, 
Broechusen, Kessel, Herlaar (lord of Ammersoyen), Vorne (Valkenburg), Cranendonc, and leaders of 
several smaller retinues.
185
 Dirk of Brederode is not listed as having received wages. 
The lords of Herlaar and of Culemborg were also a baenrots of William V in 1356, out a total 
of eight baenrotsen at the time.
186
 Even before the marshal Dirk lord of Brederode was awarded the 
same honor. This indicates that these men were in no way lesser men. The lords of Culemborg, 
Heukekelom, Montfoort, Langerak, Merwede, Vianen and Ysselstein were also council members in 
the council of Holland. As was Dirk of Brederode.
187
 Rost of Wijlre also served as an occasional 
council member on William V’s committal council.
188
 It underscores the point that these men were 
treated as trusted vassals. 
 That this war is no exception is shown by the actions of count Albrecht. In 1382 he rode out 
to support the duke of Brabant. Key forces were supplied by the magnates from Holland (including 
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Brederode). But large contingents also came from the river lands of Holland and Utrecht, including 
the lords of Abcoude, Vianen, Heukelom and Asperen, and the viscount of Montfoort.
189
 
The same applied to the duke of Brabant. The force he collected in 1371 before the battle of 
Baesweiler, consisted of nobles from various counties, including Brederode and William of Abcoude. 
Where the latter appears to have recruited mostly men from his domains, the former led a 
composite force of international origins.
190
 This is surprisingly similar to the reference made in the 
muster roll, as the only retinue which is explicitly referred to as of mixed origins, is Brederode’s.
191
 
A noteworthy form of lordly compensation was the toll exemption. Apart from the income 
from tolls used for example for fief rents, vassals could be rewarded with exemptions, as 
demonstrated by the Kessel example above. Count William also rewarded various men with toll 
exemptions.
192
 The income of the Count collected for the war against Utrecht lists the receipt of a 
sum, paid by lord Rost of Wijlre, to ship his cloister wines free of tolls. As this was part of the account 
of the war, but granted after it had ended, it appears to be a reward for past services.
193
 Gijsbrecht of 
Vianen fought during the campaign of 1355, in exchange for which the city of Vianen was granted toll 
exemption.
194
 John of Culemborg also supported William V, for which the citizens of Culemborg were 
rewarded with an exemption from Zeeland and Holland's tolls.
195
 Neither the lord of Vianen nor the 
lord of Culemborg is listed as having received wages. 
Apart from wages, income from fief rents, or toll exemptions, William V’s men-at-arms 
received compensation for the loss of warhorses. Their importance during the war is indicated by 
their number and their prominence in both the muster roll and the accounts.
196
 According to Boffa at 
the muster the quality of the mount would also be estimated.
197
 However, most letters state that the 
value is based on the former owner’s word.
198
 None of the contingents in the roll proper include a 
description of the horse, suggesting the estimate was made after the horse’s death. The risk of over 
valuation was apparently weighed by the clerk. 
Although the letters granted by the marshal listed the value, the accounts show that the 
settlement actually paid was often less. For example, Philips of Polen received eighty old écu, twenty 
less than he claimed, and set out in the letter of restor.
199
 Similarly, the troop of Dicke also received 
restor, apart from the mentioned costs. Yet, they all received considerably less than claimed. In most 
cases the men were cut back between five and ten old écu. In one case twenty old écu less. This 
amount was clearly not a relative penalty, as the cheaper horses around twenty old écu were 
reassessed no different than the expensive ones, up to eighty old écu.
200
 
 Overall William V seems to have used a mixture of fief rents, wages and toll exemptions to 
pay his mounted troops. There are no indications that he used letters of indenture, although the 
practice was known in the Low Countries by this time.
201
 The fact that the right to restor takes such a 
prominent place in the rolls and in the accounts supports this assumption. Its disappearance is 
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associated with the increased use of indentures.
202
 The count appears to have used the multitude of 
links and relationships which existed amongst the members of this community of men-at-arms. The 
only troops which appear to have served just for wages are the foot men, mostly archers. The various 
units are mentioned in the accounts only because they received wages, as described above. As in 
Brabant, they are the only ones which qualify as mercenaries.  
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Conclusion 
 
William V collected a large number of mounted troops, close to 3000 horses, which rode out to 
Utrecht in a chevauchée in May and June of 1356. The conflict, which started in November the year 
before, was until then characterized by raids and counter raids. Count William commanded various 
forces, especially garrisons to the west and north of Utrecht. The support of the lords from the river 
lands allowed him to practically surround the city. Although the size of the various garrisons is 
unknown, the references in the sources and the overall size of the mounted force, which was, by 
contemporary standards, a large force, suggest that foot men played a very limited role. 
 A high percentage of the men-at-arms came from the duchies of Guelders and Jülich, more 
than the county Holland proper provided. Especially if one considers that the contribution of some of 
the major lords of the river lands, e.g. Culemborg and Vianen, is not even part of the roll, the 
contribution from the river lands must have been very high. It is also interesting that such a high 
percentage of the retinues come from the upstream Meuse area near Roermond, the region of 
Guelders called Overkwartier. It underscores the point that the river lands were “an attractive place 
for ambitious nobles.”
203
 
However, men from all neighboring principalities took part, members of what has been called 
the community of men-at-arms. They served the count and were a member of this community 
through a myriad of links and relationships, traditional fiefdoms but also fief-rents. They also 
received wages, with the noteworthy exception of Brederode, a by then more modern practice. 
 It may be presumed that most were veterans, well suited for, what appears to have been 
William V’s plan, a show of force, a challenge to the bishop. It was carried out by a chevauchée 
through the bishop’s lands. And it seems to have worked. It put a stop to the near continuous state 
of war which had reigned between the count and the bishop since 1345. And the point the count 
made, proved to be sufficiently clear to ensure peace (or at least avoid open hostilities) for almost 
two decades. 
The main beneficiaries to the conflicts outcome may have been the various lords from the 
river lands. Their toll exemptions and the curtailed power of the bishop will have profited them most 
of all. The military exploits of some, and not just from Jülich, suggests that they profited from war in 
any event, be it wages or plunder. But clearly the toll exemptions had value as well, if not for 
themselves then at least for their subjects. The fact that even Rost of Wijlre acquired such an 
exemption, suggests that many had vested interests in trade, above and beyond the money they 
extracted in tolls. Trade was the linchpin; typically, in 1373, renewal of hostilities was again related to 
a threat to trade.
204
 
William V is likely to have benefited mostly from the moral rewards. He had demonstrated 
the bishop’s inability to either defeat him or stop him from despoiling his lands. He had shown his 
commitment to his allies and strengthened his hold over the river lands. His loss in 1348 had been 
avenged and the bishop’s ambition had been cut to size. William will have benefited from the 
increased control of the lords in the river lands, but most of them appear to have been rather 
independent minded. Until the advent of the Burgundians, the river lands remained the seedbed for 
conflicts in the Low Countries, and their lords remained a powerful force in the border lands between 
Holland, Brabant, Utrecht and Guelders. 
Although William V clearly preferred soldiers (i.e. troops served for wages) for the war 
against Utrecht, his suggested preference for English archers is not evident. Given the communalities 
in composition, character, type of operations and size, it appears far more likely that William V’s 
force was comparable to those Duke Wencelas fielded during the second half of the fourteenth 
century. Boffa calls these classical cavalry heavy forces, with a relatively small number of archers. In 
addition, William V’s use of fief rents, opposed to indentures also suggests a limited English 
influence. He appears to have been firmly rooted in the military traditions of his time. 
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Annex 1: List of retinues* 
 
Leader no. of 
horses 
Origin References 
Adsillen 15 ??? ??? 
Ballen, Johan of 13 Berg? ?presumably from Berg 
Barmen, Henric of, 24 Guelders ?Heinrich of Barmen, knight, related to the knight with the same 
name who ransomed the city of Erkelens and other places in 
1403.
205
 
Bastaert, John the  9 Holland? ?John de Bastaard, bastard son of count William III, William 
IV’uncle.
206
 
Bellinchove, John 
Lord of 
86 Guelders John, Lord of Bellinghoven, from Erkelens, along the Meuse 
river.
207
 Also listed as vassal of the duke of Cleves.
208
 
Binsvelt, Lord Rost of 36 Jülich Rost von Binsfelt, retinue from Binsfelt and Disternich, friend of 
Johan von Schleiden
209
 
Brederode, Dirk Lord 
of 
276 Holland Dirk, Lord of Brederode was a magnate from Holland, although he 
sided with Margret in 1350 and was considered one of the leaders 
of the Hooks, he was granted amnesty on 8 December 1354, early 
1356 he was again part of the comital council.
210
 
Broechuysen, John 
Lord of  
90 Guelders Johan, Lord of Broekhuizen, near the Meuse
211
, his brother William 
was lord of Wickrade.
212
 The latter was a member of the Riede 
retinue. 
Cranendonc, Lord of 234 Brabant Lord of Cranendonc major noble from the area around Den Bosch; 
first named in the invitation to do homage to the count of Flanders 
during the Brabant wars of succession war, August 1356.
213
 
Dicke, Coenraad of 
the 
44 Guelders Coenraed, Lord of the Dicke, castle near Zutphen, Guelders, he 
witnessed the lantfriede of Guelders and Cleve of 1359.
214
  
Drien, Gherijt of 37 ??? ??? 
Elmpt, William of 36 Jülich William of Elmpt, knight, from Elmpt on the Meuse, drost of 
Montfoort
215
, member of the household of the count of Loon 
(1361) and witness to a treaty on behalf of the duke of Jülich 
(1375)
216
.He became leaseholder of the dean and chapter of 
Xanten in 1363.
217
 
Ghimmenich, John 8 Jülich knight, he stood surety for a payment of a loan by William III to the 
steward of Aachen.
218
  
Ghomghijs, John of 20 Hainaut knight, Gommegnie, Hainaut.
219
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Hessen, Didderic of 32 Cleves Didderic of Hessen, knight witnessed the lantfriede of Guelders and 
Cleve of 1359.
220
 He may have been the same who witnessed, as a 
squire, a charter by the count of Cleves in 1322.
221
 
Harlair, John Lord of 68** Guelders John, Lord of Herlaar and Ameide.
222
 
Harlair, Arnt 175 Guelders Arnt of Herlaer, knight, lord of Ammersoyen, witnessed the 
lantfriede of Guelders and Cleve of 1359. 
223
 
Hoclem, John Lord of 61 Holland John, Lord of Heukelom was scion of a cadet branch of the house of 
Arkel, during the war against Utrecht in 1355 and 1356 he was 
member of the comital council on several occasions.
224
 
Kessel, John of 45 Guelders John of Kessel, knight, domains on the Meuse
225
, witness to the 
marriage agreement between the duke of Guelders and the 
daughter of Albrecht in 1368.
226
 
Hoerne, jonkheer of 302 Guelders Dirk Loef of Hoorne, son of the Lord of Hoorne, domains on the 
Meuse river.
227
 Dirk is the builder of castle Loevenstein and witness 
to a settlement imposed by Albrecht upon Dordrecht.
228
 
Mirlaer*** 30 Guelders ?Jacob, lord of Myerlaer and Milendonk, witnesses to the 
lantfriede of Guelders and Cleve of 1359, as was Johan of Mierlaer, 
member of the Vorne retinue.
229
 
Knepken, Henric of 10 ??? ??? 
[Mirach/Mijrach] 15 ??? ??? 
Ortwijch 37 ??? ??? 
Porze, Sander of 22 Berg/Guelders? ?Sander of Porze (Berg?), knight, names refer to places in the lands 
between Meuse and Rhine. 
Riede, Lord of 170 Holland ?Herbaren, Lord of Riede, heir of the Hook with the same name 
who died just before the outbreak of war.
230231
 
Roisin, Lord of 22**** Hainaut Lord of Roisin, who also accompanied Albrecht to England in 
1364.
232
 
Rost, Lord of Wilre 276 Jülich Rost, Lord of Wijlre.
233
 
Scayle  19 ??? knight. 
Sleyden, Lord of 165 Luxemburg Johan, Lord von Schleiden
234
 
Sleyden, Lord of (2) none Luxemburg These thirty six men are listed without a reference to horses, this 
may be the list of men held at Montfoort, the number roughly 
corresponds to the number provided by the chronicle, i.e. forty.
235
 
Steyghenberg, John 
of 
12 ??? ??? 
Stummelen, Roelof of 30 ??? knight. 
Vorne, Walraven 165 Guelders Walraven, Lord of Borne, later Lord of Valkenburg (Fauqemont) 
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Lord of, witnessed the treaty between William and the duke of Guelders of 
3 November 1348.
236
  He was present when Albrecht entered 
another treaty with the duke of Guelders eleven years later.
237
. 
Vossem, Sander 27 Guelders Sander of Vossem, knight, witnessed the lantfriede of Guelders and 
Cleve of 1359.
238
 Councilmember of the duke of Guelders in 
1380.
239
 Also mentioned as a vassal of the count of Cleves.
240
 
Ysenderen, Wouter 
of 
132 Guelders Wouter of Ysendoren witnessed the lantfriede of Guelders and 
Cleve of 1359 
241
, Wouter was a vassal of the duke of Guelders.
242
 
Zevenbergen, Claes 
jonkheer of 
198 Holland ?Claes of Zevenbergen, son of Gerard of Strijen Lord of 
Zevenbergen.
243
 
* Men listed as ”lord [name]“ have been listed as knights, as this title was used for knights during the 
fourteenth century, opposed to the title ”lord of [name]“ which indicates a lordship.
244
 
** Twenty one horses served for only fifteen days. 
** May have not led in person, his brother Johan was member of the retinue of Walraven of 
Vorne.
245
 
**** Sixteen horses served for only nineteen days.  
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